RISC Seminars (Research on Information Security and Cryptology)
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RISC Seminar
Date: | October 6 |
Location: | CWI, Room L202 |
Schedule: | |
13:30 | Yael Tauman Kalai (Microsoft Research): Cryptography Resilient to Physical Attacks Abstract: Traditionally, cryptographers assume that the secret keys are totally
hidden from the adversary,and that the cryptographic algorithms are run
“correctly” with no errors. Unfortunately, in reality there are various
real-world physical attacks, which render this assumption false. These
include leakage attacks, such as, timing, power, and acoustic attacks,
which allow an adversary to (continually) leak information about the
secret keys. In addition, there are various tampering attacks,
including heat and EM radiation attacks, which allow an adversary to
(continually) tamper with system. Recently, there has been a vast and
growing body of work, which try to secure cryptographic systems against
leakage attacks. However, there have been quite few results trying to
protect systems against tampering attacks.
In this talk, I will focus on the goal of trying to protect
cryptographic systems against tampering attacks. I will focus on two
recent results. One which shows how to construct encryption and
signature schemes that are secure against an adversary that continually
leaks and tampers (arbitrarily) with the secret key. The second result
allows the adversary to tamper with the algorithm itself (as opposed to
tamper only with the secret key), but guarantees security only against
specific monotone faults.
The first result is based on joint work with Bhavana Kanukurthi and Amit
Sahai, and the second result is based on joint work with Allison Lewko,
and Anup Rao.
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